Traditional agency theory interprets limits to shareholder rights as entrenching corporate management and is likely to lower shareholder value. At this symposium, some new results challenging this interpretation are presented and discussed. If shareholders have limited information and limited commitment to the firm, this may threaten firms engaged in long-term projects and firms dependent on long-term relationships with other stakeholders.
This LAMB conference will bring together a panel of experts, both scholars in corporate law and corporate finance and practicing lawyers, to present new empirical evidence in this area and discuss its implications for corporate law and governance.
The panel will include:
K.J. Martijn Cremers, Professor of Finance, Mendoza College of Business and LAMB Faculty Fellow, University of Notre Dame (moderator)
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Professor of Law and Milton Handler Fellow, Columbia Law School
William C. Johnson, Assistant Professor of Finance, Suffolk University, Sawyer Business School
Trevor S. Norwitz, Partner, Watchell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz and Lecturer, Columbia Law School
Simone Sepe, Associate Professor of Law and Finance, University of Arizona College of Law
Avishalom Tor, Professor of Law and Director, Research Program on Law and Market Behavior, Notre Dame Law School
Julian Velasco, Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School
View Conference Program: ND LAMB Symposium: Limiting Shareholder Rights